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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order granting Fenton’s motion to
suppress, arguing that the district court erred by failing to correctly apply the doctrine of
attenuation to this case.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On February 28, 2016, Lewiston Patrol Officer Eylar was running stationary traffic
enforcement in a marked police car when a red GMC Yukon drove past his location.
(R., p.102; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.7, L.5 – p.8, L.11.) Believing that the Yukon was registered
to someone Officer Eylar knew (from prior contact) was involved in narcotic activity, he
chose to follow the vehicle. (R., p.102; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.8, Ls.11-15.) After watching the
Yukon pull into an A&B Foods store parking lot, Officer Eylar made a loop around the
block and then pulled into a nearby cemetery from which he could observe the vehicle.
(8/4/2016 Tr., p.8, L.16 – p.9, L.1.)

Officer Eylar knew from experience that drug

transactions often occurred at the A&B Foods store.

(R., p.102; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.9,

Ls.15-22.)
Eventually, the Yukon exited on the opposite side, now followed by a white
Pontiac Grand Prix.

(R., p.102; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.9, L.14.) Officer Eylar

radioed Officer Stormes requesting backup and then continued to follow the vehicles.
(8/4/2016 Tr., p.9, L.23 – p.10, L.5.) Eventually, Officer Eylar observed the vehicles
park at the Zip Trip gas station, and he pulled into a nearby parking lot to try and keep
an eye on them. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.10, L.9 – p.11, L.1.) Officer Stormes then arrived, and
Officer Eylar conveyed his observations. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.11, Ls.1-11.) Believing that
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the occupants of the observed vehicles were waiting for the officers to leave before
conducting any business, the officers decided that Officer Stormes should leave the
area. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-18.)
Shortly after Officer Stormes began to drive away, the Grand Prix also left the
gas station. (R., p.102; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.11, Ls.19-23.) Officer Eylar contacted Officer
Stormes to inform him that the vehicle had left, and Officer Stormes turned around to
follow the Grand Prix. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.12, Ls.3-5; p.18, Ls.16-25.) Officer Stormes
radioed dispatch to check the car’s registration, initially reading the license plate as
“Idaho plate 180728,” but dispatch interpreted “Idaho” as the county and ran the plate
as “Ida 180728.” (8/4/2016 Tr., p.20, Ls.9-15.) Dispatch found no record of that plate.
(R., p.102.) Officer Stormes tried replacing the final digit with a “B,” but that, too, failed
to return a record. (R., p.102; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.20, Ls.16-20.) After catching up with the
Grand Prix, he correctly transmitted the Nez Perce county plate number as “Nora
180728.” (8/4/2016 Tr., p.22, Ls.6-9.) While a record on that plate did return, the officer
was not informed of the return until after the investigation was concluded. (8/4/2016 Tr.,
p.22, Ls.10-14; p.31, L.11 – p.32, L.1.) Unaware that the plate had returned a record,
he conducted a traffic stop on Fenton’s vehicle. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.22, Ls.15-24.)
Officer Stormes contacted Fenton, the driver of the vehicle, and he provided the
officer with the vehicle’s registration. (R., p.103; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.22, L.25 – p.23, L23.)
Officer Stormes also requested Fenton’s driver’s license and proof of insurance, both of
which he lacked, so the officer wrote-out citations for both violations.

(R., p.103;

8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, Ls.3-9.) Then, as he returned Fenton’s documents and issued those
citations, Fenton volunteered that he was on probation. (R., p.103; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.24,
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Ls.16-25; see also DVD at 30:30-31:00.) Officer Stormes withheld the second citation
and, following standard procedures, contacted the probation office. (R., p.103; 8/4/2016
Tr., p.25, Ls.12-22.) Officer Stormes spoke with Probation Officer Jensen, told her that
he had pulled over Fenton and cited him, and relayed Officer Eylar’s observations of
potential drug activity. (R., p.103; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.25, L.16 – p.26, L.23; see also DVD at
32:30-35:30.) Probation Officer Jensen decided she would come to the location of the
stop to search Fenton’s car. (R., p.104; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.27, Ls.2-4.) Officer Stormes
then returned and gave Fenton the remaining citation, let him know that the probation
officer was on her way and had requested Fenton to remain, and then turned off his
vehicle’s overhead lights. (R., p.104; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.26, L.25 – p.27, L.9.)
Roughly ten minutes later, Probation Officer Jensen arrived on scene. (8/4/2016
Tr., p.27, Ls.10-15.) She had Fenton step out of the vehicle and sit on the sidewalk,
and then requested Officer Stormes’ assistance to conduct a search of the vehicle. 1
(8/4/2016 Tr., p.27, Ls.16-25.) As they began searching the vehicle, Fenton fled on
foot. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.28, L.11 – p.29, L.3.) As several officers went to apprehend
Fenton, Officer Stormes, later joined by Probation Officer Jensen, completed the
search.

(8/4/2016 Tr., p.29, Ls.4-6.)

The officers seized large bags of crystalline
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In addition to several minor errors throughout its factual background, the district court
notes that “when the probation officer arrived she asked Fenton to step out of the
vehicle and he was handcuffed for officer safety reasons.” (R., p.104.) In fact, Fenton
conceded that he was not handcuffed during the encounter. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.4, L.12 –
p.5, L.6.) Rather, while the probation officer may have “suggested that [the officers]
should handcuff Mr. Fenton” (5/18/2016 Tr., p.13, Ls.11-17), Fenton “was not
handcuffed at that point” but was “simply told to sit on the curb” (8/4/2016 Tr., p.28,
Ls.1-3; see also DVD at 47:15-49:00). If Fenton was ever handcuffed, that would have
occurred when he was re-apprehended following his flight, and after the search of his
vehicle was already completed.
3

substance, later identified as methamphetamine. (R., p.104; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.29, Ls.620.)
The state charged Fenton with trafficking in methamphetamine.

(R., p.52.)

Fenton filed a motion to suppress the evidence acquired during the probation search,
asserting that both his traffic stop and probation search were unlawful. (R., pp.66-75.)
The district court held a hearing on the suppression motion (R., pp.87-88; see also
8/4/2016 Tr.) and, following that hearing, granted Fenton’s suppression motion on the
ground that the traffic stop was unlawful (R., pp.101-09).

The state requested

reconsideration based on the doctrine of attenuation (R., pp.116-18), which the district
court subsequently denied (R., pp.175-79). The state filed a notice of appeal timely
from the order granting suppression. (R., pp.161-63.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it granted Fenton’s suppression motion?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Granted Fenton’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The state does not challenge the district court’s analysis in relation to the

reasonableness

of

Officer

Stormes’

mistake

of

fact

when,

based

on

his

miscommunication with dispatch regarding Fenton’s license plate, he pulled over the
vehicle believing it lacked valid registration. (See R., pp.104-09.) Whether the officer’s
mistake was reasonable is irrelevant in this case because the resulting traffic
investigation did not produce evidence.

Rather, the evidence in this case was

discovered during a valid probation search, which was distinct from Officer Stormes’
initial detention. Application of the relevant legal standards shows that, because the
evidence was acquired during a valid search, the district court erred when it granted
Fenton’s suppression motion.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,
843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004).
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C.

The Search Of Fenton’s Vehicle Was A Valid Probation Search To Which Fenton
Consented As A Condition Of Probation
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Warrantless searches are generally considered unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).

One exception to the warrant requirement is a search done

pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations
omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003). Freely and
voluntarily given consent validates a search. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222 (citations
omitted). When a probationer or parolee, as an express term of his release, has waived
his right to be free from a warrantless search, such warrantless searches are valid.
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 209, 207 P.3d 182, 185 (2009) (citing State v. Gawron,
112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987)).
At the time of the contested search, Fenton was on probation.

(R., p.103;

8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, Ls.19-25.) At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated to the
admission of Fenton’s probation agreement (8/4/2016 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-25), which the
prosecutor attached as an exhibit to his closing brief (R., pp.98-100). The terms and
conditions of Fenton’s probation, as shown by the agreement, included a waiver of his
Fourth Amendment rights regarding searches, under which he agreed to
consent to the search of his person, residence, vehicle, personal property,
and other real property or structures owned or leased by the defendant or
for which the defendant is the controlling authority. The search will be
7

conducted by the IDOC district manager, section supervisor, or PPO or
law enforcement officer. The defendant waives his Fourth Amendment
rights concerning searches.
(R., p.153 (emphasis added).) Because Fenton specifically consented to “search[es] of
his … vehicle” that were “conducted by the … PPO” and waived his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from warrantless searches, the warrantless search in this case, which
was conducted under the probation officer’s authority, was valid.
Below, Fenton argued that his initial detention was unlawful (R., pp.70-73) and
the district court agreed (R., pp.104-09).2 In its motion seeking reconsideration, the
state correctly noted that, even if the initial detention had been unlawful, the probation
search was still valid under the doctrine of attenuation. (R., pp.116-18.) The district
court, however, held “[i]n this case, but for the officer’s error, the Defendant’s vehicle
would not have been stopped, and the probation officer would not have been
contacted—thus a search would not have occurred.” (R., p.179.) But that is not the
correct legal test. While the inquiry may begin with a “but for” analysis, it does not end
there; not “all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have
come to light but for illegal actions of the police.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 487-88 (1963). “Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made
has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently

2

Fenton also asserted that the probation search was invalid because it was not based
on reasonable suspicion that Fenton had violated his probation. (R., pp.73-75.) This
argument fails. Even assuming the probation officer lacked reasonable suspicion of a
violation, as shown above, reasonable suspicion was not required to conduct the search
of Fenton’s car under the terms of his probation, to which he voluntarily agreed.
8

distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id. at 488 (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
In State v. Page, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a three factor test to
determine whether unlawful conduct had been adequately attenuated. Id., 140 Idaho at
846, 103 P.3d at 459. “The factors are: (1) the elapsed time between the misconduct
and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances,
and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.” Id. (citation
omitted); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). No one factor is
dispositive and not all must be resolved in favor of the state before the doctrine of
attenuation becomes applicable. See State v. Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 549, 6
P.3d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 2000). “The test only requires a balancing of the relative
weights of all the factors, viewed together, in order to determine if the police exploited
an illegality to discover evidence.” Id. (citing United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542,
549-550 (4th Cir. 1998)).
In Page, the officer contacted the defendant when he saw him carrying some
bags and walking down the middle of the road at 2:00 a.m. Id., 140 Idaho at 455-56,
103 P.3d at 842-43. The officer took Page’s driver’s license to verify his identification
through dispatch, and learned that Page had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Id.
at 56, 103 P.3d at 843. The officer then arrested Page and, during a search incident to
that arrest, discovered contraband. Id. Page sought, and was granted, suppression by
the district court, and the state appealed. Id.
The Court determined that, though the initial encounter was lawful, when the
officer seized Page’s driver’s license he illegally detained Page. Id. at 845, 103 P.3d at
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458. However, applying the three factor test, the Court determined that the discovery of
the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the primary illegality and reversed the
district court. Id. at 846-47, 103 P.3d at 459-60. Though there was a minimal timelapse between the illegal seizure and the search pursuant to the valid arrest warrant,
the “officer’s conduct was not flagrant, nor was his purpose improper.” Id. Once the
officer discovered the warrant—an intervening event—he was justified in arresting
Page. Id. Once he had arrested Page, he could lawfully search him incident to that
arrest. Id. “Therefore, it was not unlawful for the officer to seize the drugs discovered
incident to that arrest.” Id.
The Court cautioned, however, “that had the drug evidence in this case been
seized after the officer seized Page’s license and took it back to the patrol vehicle, but
prior to discovery of the valid warrant,” the doctrine of attenuation would not apply. Id.
at 847, 103 P.3d at 460.
In such a case, evidence seized prior to the arrest, unless justified by
some other exception, would not be admissible simply because,
ultimately, a valid arrest warrant was discovered. A judicial determination
of probable cause focuses on the information and facts the officers
possessed at the time. It is only the fact that there was an intervening
factor between the unlawful seizure and discovery of the evidence—the
discovery of the warrant in this case—that creates the exception, which
permitted the officer to arrest Page and made the subsequent seizure of
the evidence admissible.
Id.
More recently, the United States Supreme Court applied this same three factor
test in Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056 (2016). In that case, following an anonymous tip
of drug activity, officers conducted surveillance on a home where they observed visitors
frequently departing within minutes of arriving at the house. Id. at 2059. After Strieff
10

exited the house, an officer detained him and took his identification card. Id. at 2060.
Running Strieff’s information through dispatch, the officer learned that Strieff had an
outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Id. The officer arrested Strieff on the
warrant and, during a search incident to that arrest, discovered a baggie of
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Id.
Strieff sought suppression of the evidence, arguing that his detention was
unlawful. Id. The state conceded that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the
initial detention, but argued that “the existence of a valid arrest warrant attenuated the
connection between the unlawful stop and the discovery of the contraband.”

Id.

Applying the three factor test, the United States Supreme Court agreed. Id. at 2061-63.
First, the temporal proximity between the initially unlawful detention and the discovery of
evidence favored suppression. Id. at 2062. But, second, the presence of intervening
circumstances—in this case, the arrest warrant—strongly favored attenuation. Id. As
the Supreme Court noted, “the warrant was valid, it predated [the officer’s] investigation,
and it was entirely unconnected with the stop.” Id. And, third, the officer’s conduct was
not flagrant; at most it was negligent. Id. at 2063. There was “no indication that [the]
unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.” Id.
Even assuming the primary illegality of Fenton’s initial detention, application of
the forgoing legal standards to this case shows that there was no exploitation of that
alleged illegality. Officer Stormes conducted a traffic stop on Fenton’s vehicle based on
misreading Fenton’s license plate, which failed to return proper registration through
dispatch. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.19, L.11 – p.22, L.24.) The subsequent traffic investigation
conducted by the officer yielded two minor infractions—failure to purchase a license and
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failure to provide proof of insurance. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, Ls.3-9.) Officer Stormes
wrote-out both citations and then, while returning Fenton’s documents and citations,
Fenton volunteered that he was on probation. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, Ls.16-25.) Based on
the terms and conditions of that probation, as shown above, Officer Stormes could have
then conducted a search of Fenton. (See R., p.153.) But he did not. Instead, the
officer withheld a single citation and, in accordance with standard procedures, contacted
the probation office. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.25, Ls.12-22.)
Officer Stormes reached Probation Officer Jensen and relayed the incident of the
traffic stop and Officer Eylar’s observations of potential drug activity. (8/4/2016 Tr.,
p.25, L.16 – p.26, L.23.) Based on that information, Probation Officer Jensen decided
she would come to the stop and search Fenton’s car. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.27, Ls.2-4.)
Officer Stormes then gave Fenton the remaining citation, let him know that the probation
officer was on her way and had requested Fenton to remain, and then turned off his
vehicle’s overhead lights. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.26, L.25 – p.27, L.9.) At that point, Fenton
was no longer being detained by Officer Stormes in connection with the traffic
investigation; he was detained at the probation officer’s request—which is consistent
with another of the conditions of Fenton’s probation requiring him to give probation
officers access to his “vehicle for the purpose of … inspections, or other supervision
functions.” (R., p.154.) About ten minutes later, Probation Officer Jensen arrived to
conduct a search of Fenton’s vehicle, during which the evidence was discovered.
(8/4/2016 Tr., p.27, Ls.10-15; p.29, Ls.4-20.)
Though this case may not have the same intervening circumstance as was
present in both Page and Strieff—an active arrest warrant—the intervening
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circumstances that exist in this case are at least as strong. The search of Fenton’s
vehicle occurred after the initial traffic stop had been completed and all citations had
been issued to Fenton. That search was conducted on Probation Officer Jenson’s
authority, not Officer Stormes’ authority, and it was Probation Officer Jenson’s decision
to search the vehicle, not Officer Stormes’ decision.

It appears Probation Officer

Jenson made that decision, not based on information learned during the traffic stop—
the traffic investigation only yielded two minor traffic infractions—but on the report of
Officer Eylar’s observations of potential drug activity. (See 8/4/2016 Tr., p.26, Ls.3-23.)
Those observations occurred before the traffic stop and so could not have been tainted
by it. Finally, Officer Stormes learned that Fenton was on probation, not by running his
records through dispatch, but because Fenton volunteered that information. The many
intervening circumstances in this case weigh strongly in favor of attenuation.
Moreover, while there is some temporal proximity between the initial detention
and the discovery of the evidence, that proximity is far more remote than in either Strieff
or Page. The traffic investigation had been completed in this case, and Fenton was
only detained on the probation officer’s request. As the much nearer temporal proximity
in Strieff merely “favor[ed] suppressing the evidence,” as compared to the factors which
“strongly favor[ed] the State,” see id., 136 S.Ct. at 2062, the lesser temporal proximity in
this case should, at most, weakly favor suppression.
Finally, as in Strieff, there is no indication that the stop here was part of any
systemic or recurrent police misconduct.

The officer did not flagrantly abuse his

authority; he made a mistake when reading Fenton’s license plate.
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The lack of

flagrancy in the officer’s arguably invalid traffic stop, like the several intervening
circumstances in this case, weighs strongly in favor of attenuation.
Taken together, the balance of the relevant legal factors strongly favors
attenuation. Even assuming that Fenton’s initial detention was illegal, Fenton’s later
probation search was still valid because the probation officer did not exploit any primary
illegality. That probation search resulted in the discovery of the evidence Fenton sought
to suppress. Because the evidence was acquired during the valid probation search, the
district court erred when it granted Fenton’s suppression motion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order
granting Fenton’s suppression motion and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of February, 2017.

_/s/ Russell J. Spencer______
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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